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Abstract 
This study focuses on ethnopolitical secessionist conflicts where, for historic, symbolic 
or spiritual reasons, the disputed space cannot be divided into sub-units but still, 
because of a mutually hurting stalemate (the cost of continued violence exceeds the 
perceived cost of negotiation), cannot be resolved in any way other than through 
negotiations. The stakes in such conflicts are not just “indivisible,” but have become 
“absolute” in the perception of the parties. Territorial “absolutes” cannot be exchanged 
for something else (like security), paid off (by compensation), or substituted (by 
territory somewhere else). Parties in such disputes often have identical or extremely 
similar (but exclusive) interests concerning a territory that is so well defined that 
flexibility is impossible to introduce. Two of the most prominent examples of absolute 
territorial conflict are Kosovo and Israel/Palestine.  
Sacredness is an integral part of territorial absolutes because the spiritual connection 
between the land and the identity of an ethnic group makes these conflicts different 
from most conflicts of secession or independence. When two ethnic groups have 
interlocking histories in a land that at least one side perceives as absolute, the dispute 
goes beyond the normal notions of self-determination or sovereignty. Whereas in most 
violent conflict situations, parties eventually reach a point where it is clear that 
continuing the conflict incurs higher costs than what would be lost through negotiation, 
conflicts over territorial absolutes seem to never reach this point. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that violence sometimes is sustained at low levels, enabling actors 
to keep refurbishing a dispute for generations. However, the argument put forth in this 
paper is that for many actors whose connection with a disputed territory is “absolute,” 
no cost, including death, is too high if compared to giving up any of the land to the 
enemy group. This study explores “territorial absolutes” conceptually in order to explain 
how absolute perceptions influence conflict management and negotiation. 
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“Sacred Stones & Religious Nuts” 
Negotiating Ethnic Disputes Over Absolute Space 
Tova Norlen 
Introduction 
One of the most striking realities for conflict management today is that we seem to be 
lacking the means to deal with some of the most protracted ethnic conflicts of our time. 
Typical for these conflicts is that they have strong ethno-political1 characteristics 
combined with secessionist or irredentist claims. 
They cannot be resolved because of the close relationship between ethnic identity of a 
group, and the symbolic and spiritual values connected to the issue at stake. A threat to 
these values leads to fears for group survival. However, although the presence of 
existential fears is enough to complicate the negotiation process, the focus here goes 
beyond those threats and looks at how the nature of the conflicting claims – as well as 
the dynamics created by this nature – complicates and debilitates the negotiation 
process. No negotiator, however skilful, can succeed if certain characteristics of an issue 
make the conflict non-negotiable. It is the combination of such non-negotiable issues 
with symbolic and spiritual values that makes the negotiation process so difficult. 
Territorial claims in internal conflicts are seen as the some of the most difficult 
questions to resolve in negotiation. Anatole Ayssi writes: 
Claims for territory give rise to notoriously complicated conflicts. […] Conflicts of 
this type contain all the pitfalls of civil wars and nearly none of their “better” 
qualities; at least as far as conflict negotiation and preventive diplomacy are 
concerned. They are highly intractable conflicts—lengthy and merciless wars 
without a front. Moreover, they are permeable to outside intervention. Because of 
this explosive combination of factors, these disputes are probably among the 
worst that preventive negotiations must confront.2 
Of all ethnic conflicts, the most difficult type to resolve is that which involves stakes 
that are seen as “absolutes” in the eyes of the participants. What complicates the 
prospects for negotiation and bargaining in such conflicts is that the absolute nature of 
                                                 
1 E thnopolitical groups are identity groups whose ethnicity has political consequences, See Gurr, People 
versus States (2000) 
2 Anatole Ayissi, “Territorial Conflicts: Claiming the Land,” in Zartman (ed.), Preventive Negotiation: 
Avoiding Conflict E scalation (2001), pp. 41-66 
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the stake is reinforced by a combination of additional powerful dimensions: ethnicity, 
history and religion/symbolism.3  
The goal of the negotiation process is often to transform value-laden claims into 
interest-based problem solving. There are then different strategies to deal with the 
underlying issues of a conflict. In their book, Negotiation in Social Conflict, Dean Pruitt 
and Peter Carnevale explain how “win-win” solutions could be constructed by 
expanding the pie, exchanging concessions and solving the parties’ underlying 
concerns.4 However, they acknowledge that in situations where both parties’ interests 
are identical, “win-win” solutions may just not be possible.5 In conflicts over absolute 
space the parties often have an identical or extremely similar perception of what the 
conflict is about because it often concerns territory so well defined that no flexibility 
can be introduced, and histories (of the parties) so different that they can never be 
reconciled.6 Territorial absolutes are inherently zero-sum and unless one side wins all, 
the other side is likely to keep fighting. They are pieces of land that you cannot 
purchase for any price, or perhaps even more succinctly, land that at all cost has to be 
denied the enemy. 
Conflicts over absolute space are typically intra-state, fought between an ethnic group 
and a state, and over territory. Ethnic identity tends to act as the main mobilizing force 
for such conflicts, and the struggle is often closely related to existential questions of 
identity and survival. Absolutes concern a specific “breed” of indivisibles in conflict, 
where symbolic and spiritual elements have come into the equation, influencing the 
strength of the parties’ commitments and their tolerance for violence. While the 21st 
century is characterized by an increasingly high rate of ethnicity in international 
conflict, many of the protracted conflicts from the past century still remain unresolved.  
In a study of international crisis, Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld observed that 
crises incidents that involve ethnicity and threats to identity are often typically very 
violence-prone, while existing conflict management techniques to deal with them are 
often highly ineffective.7 Such crises often precede the outbreak of conflict. 
Ethnic conflict over absolute space is not likely to go away in the nearest future. They 
are created out of internal territorial disputes between states and ethnic groups, a type of 
dispute that has been on the rise in the international community since the 1960’s.8 
                                                 
3 Ron Hassner points out that several dimensions add to the indivisibility of sacred land: the 
geographic dimension (inflexible and clearly defined boundaries); monolithic space (cannot be 
divided into subunits); spiritual (uniqueness – no material or spiritual substitute); historical. Ron 
Hassner, “Conflict over Space and the Indivisibility Conundrum,” APSA  (2001); See also 
Kaufman, “Ethnic Violence, Symbolic Politics and the Security Dilemma,” APSA (2001). 
4 Dean Pruitt & Peter Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (1993), p. 36 
5 ibid, p. 40 
6 See Hassner, “Conflict over Sacred Space (2001) 
7 Brecher & Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (2000), p. 133 
8 Daniel Byman, & Stephen Van Evera, “Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of 
Contemporary Deadly Conflict,” Security Studies 7, no. 3 (Spring 1998), p. 24: The authors claim that 
the war problem is now largely “synonymous” with the civil war problem: only 10% of all conflicts 
in the 1900’s were international. See also Roy Licklider, Stopping the Killing – How Will Civil Wars 
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Writing about internal ethnic conflict, Ayissi notes that “a close examination of the 
stakes, attitudes, and tactics for preventive diplomacy in situations involving territorial 
claims makes it clear that these conflicts are highly complicated confrontations for 
which preventive action remains, in large part unarmed.” Success in resolving territorial 
intrastate conflicts will not come, he says, “until much time has passed” and when the 
parochial memory of groups has been replaced by “objective reason.”9 However, 
absolute conflicts over territory have often been created out of a conflictual past in 
order not to forget such “parochial memory.” For groups that grew out of the history of 
the conflict, giving up such memory would be equal to giving up one’s essential means 
of existence.  
Each conflict is unique and even those that we categorize as absolutes have no standard 
solution. Scholars often question the utility of ethnicity as a concept for describing or 
analyzing such conflicts. It is used here not to indicate a “conflict type” but as an 
element that influences the dynamics of conflict, thus adding degrees of difficulty to the 
negotiation. The argument here is that the similarities and differences in the outcomes of 
intrastate ethnic conflicts is determined not so much by the characteristics of the group 
but by their relationship to the issue at stake; i.e. the special character of the territory 
and the extent to which people are willing to make sacrifices in order to have exclusive 
ownership over it.  
The existence of elements such as fear, hostile myths, revived hatreds and memories of 
suffering should be seen as ordinal, rather than cardinal values. The more they are 
present the more will the conflict center on ethnicity and the worse and more intense 
violence tends to become.10 This study explores the concept of absolutes, its attributes 
and characteristics as well as the dynamics created when absolutes interact with the 
requirements of conflict management and negotiation. Knowing more about absolutes 
will help us understand the complexity of the problems encountered when negotiating 
ethnopolitical territorial conflicts. The analysis of the attributes of the concept of 
absolute space, leads to three general propositions that will be operationalized and 
defined in future research by the author. 
A study of territorial absolutes can make an important contribution to the conflict 
management and negotiation literature because even though conflicts over “sacred 
stones” (where religious or symbolic elements are closely intertwined with identity and 
territory) are few, almost all conflicts exhibit value-driven claims. Knowing more about 
the relationship between identity and space should thus be useful even for conflicts 
where the symbolic or spiritual dimension has not yet matured.  
Section II of this article begins with a brief overview of the most general theories on 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict, looking at the classical explanations of primordialism, 
international change, instrumentalism and constructivism. A brief outline of the 
available explanations for the relationship between territory and ethnicity then follows. 
                                                                                                                                               
E nd? (1993), p. 7; David Rapoport “The Importance of Space in Violent Ethno-Religious Strife” 
(1996); Brecher & Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (2000) 
9 Ayissi, “Territorial Conflicts” (2001), p. 63 
10 Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of E thnic War (2001), p. 36 
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Section III begins with a presentation of the main argument together with a closer look 
at absolute values, and briefly presents the extreme alternatives available for resolving 
or terminating conflicts over absolute space. A more moderate alternative, autonomy, is 
then presented as a possible instrument for managing or reducing these conflicts.  
Absolutes are introduced to the negotiation process by looking at the dynamics created 
by absolutes in negotiation. The Nature of Absolutes is then discussed and summarized 
in three propositions about territory and identity; collective suffering and resuscitated 
myths; and symbolism and religion. Section IV concludes with some open questions for 
further research. 
 Alternative Explanations of Ethnicity  
Four Approaches to Ethnic Conflict 
Out of all of the world’s independent states, 82 percent contain two or more ethnic 
groups11. Yet, conflict only occurs in a few of these places. How can this be explained? 
The school one adopts for understanding the influence of identity issues in conflict has 
an impact on the understanding of ethnicity and conflict; of how ethnic identities are 
constructed and initiated; as well as of how violence is triggered. Moreover, it has direct 
implications for the solutions you propose as well as the range of possible prescriptive 
alternatives you are able to explore.  
For the purpose of this study, four alternative explanations of the causes of ethnic 
conflict are presented: primordialism; instrumentalism;12 theories of international 
change (modernization, globalization & relative deprivation theories); and 
constructivism. Others mentioned are the symbolic politics approach,13 institutional 
explanations,14 and rational choice theories15.  
Dividing theoretical explanations into rigid categories is often a fruitless attempt. 
However, to the extent that it is done here it is important to remember that we are 
looking at ideal types, and that what we are describing is only “one leg of the elephant.” 
Incurable Conflict 
The primordialist – or the “ancient hatreds” – argument offers a simple and inexpensive 
explanation for ethnic conflict: simple, because since it sees conflict as inevitably 
flowing from ethnic differences, this in itself is the successful end of the analysis; 
inexpensive (for third parties) because if ethnic identities are “ineffable” and ”fixed”, 
conflict becomes conveniently “incurable.”16 
                                                 
11 Monica Duffy Toft, “Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War” (2001), p.1 
12 Donald Rothchild & David Lake “Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International 
Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict” (1996) 
13 Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds (2001) 
14 Deborah Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict,” Ch. One, Crawford & Lippschutz (eds.) 
The Myth of “E thnic Conflict” (1998) 
15 Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds (2001) 
16 See Lake & Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears ” (1996)  
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Clifford Geertz, an early promoter of the primordial perspective, explains primordial 
attachments as stemming from the “givens” of social existence, especially your kin.17 
The “givenness” that stems from being born into a particular religious community, 
language or dialect, and social context, make those sentiments “ineffable.” Thus, 
primordial ties are seen as a priori, natural, “incorrigible” and to some extent even 
spiritual.18 The fact that they have “overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves”19 
also makes them binding. The result is that primordial perspectives fail to take into 
account variations or changes in conflict over time and space, why some ethnic groups 
are conflictual but not others, as well as the formation of new identities and ethnicities.20 
However, while the primordial perspective may be inefficient as a basis for analysis, we 
still cannot ignore what Hutchinson and Anthony Smith call the “primordial qualities 
and mass sentiments” that many people attribute to their origin, descent or ancestral 
territory.21 It is not what is but what people perceive as is that influences their attitudes 
and behavior.22 In defense of the primordial perspective, Pierre van den Berghe writes 
that even socially constructed myths have to be “believed in” in order to be powerful. 
This, he claims, can only happen if those myths are based on substantial measures of 
“biological truth” as a result of common descent and history.23  
Ethnicity As “Social Capital” 
Ronald Lippchutz writes that there was “no compelling reason why Yugoslavia should 
fall apart along ethnic lines,” other than the ethnic names of the republics and the 
federal system of regional resource allocation.24 Instrumentalists see ethnicity and 
religion as political tools operating no different today than did democracy and 
Communism during the cold war;25 i.e., it is a label or set of symbolic ties that is used 
for political advantage by individuals and groups.26 
                                                 
17 Clifford Geertz, “Primordial Ties,” in Hutchinson & Smith (eds.), E thnicity (1996), p. 42 
18 Manning Nash, “The Core Elements of Ethnicity” in Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity (1996), p. 25: 
Nash describes primordial attachments as “blood, substance, and deity;” See also Walker Connor, 
“Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” in Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity 
(1996), p. 71; see Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor (1997), p.6 
19 Gary Goertz & Paul F Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (1992), pp. 41-42 
20 See Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity (1996), p. 32; Lake & Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears” (1996), p. 2 
21 Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity (1996), p. 32 
22 Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason…”(1996), p. 71 
23 Pierre van Den Berghe, “Does Race Matter?” in Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity (1996), p. 58 
24 Lippschutz, “Seeking a State of One’s Own: An Analytical Framework for Assessing Ethnic and 
Sectarian Conflicts,” Crawford & Lippschutz, The Myth of “E thnic Conflict” (1998), p. 37 
25 ibid (1998), p. 43 
26 See Lake & Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears…” (1996), p. 4 
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There are several strands within the “instrumentalist” approach, most notably the 
institutional framework, elite-manipulation theories, or elite rivalry arguments27. While 
their explanations vary, they tend to view ethnicity as a characteristic that is essentially 
indistinguishable from other types of affiliations; kinship is seen as “social capital” that 
can be used to acquire power and wealth in situations where rules and institutions have 
broken down.28  
The critique against the instrumentalist approach centers especially on the aspect of 
ethnicity and its relation to “ascription” or choice. In his book From Voting to Violence, 
Jack Snyder notes that although Milosevic used nationalism to his own ends, the 
character of ethnic nationalism created was such that loyalty to the state for the 
individual was partly forced.29 Ethnic identity therefore cannot be completely chosen 
(which is what many instrumentalists would argue) – most people are born and 
socialized into an ethnic context from which they cannot completely detach themselves. 
However, neither is it biological or genetic, as sometimes seems to be the view of the 
primordialists. 
 “World Disorder” 
The International change perspective moves the level of analysis to the international 
system, claiming that changes in the international power balance or system of norms 
have direct repercussions also on the regional and local level. It is commonly claimed 
that the collapse of Communism led to a new generation of ethnic, irredentist, and 
secessionist wars.30 However, there is no new “world disorder,” write Daniel Byman 
and Stephen van Evera, in response to the common observation that the post-Cold War 
period brought a new generation of wars to the forefront of international politics. The 
authors admit that the collapse of “empires”, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
initially led to a number of conflicts. But in real terms the number of total conflicts has 
fallen to below 1989 figures.31 Instead they claim that the difference can be found in the 
                                                 
27 Institutionalists may not agree that they fit into this category (See Crawford). For the elite rivalry 
argument see Gagnon, “Spiraling to Ethnic War” (1996), p. 109 
28 Lippschutz, “Seeking a State of One’s Own” (1998), p. 39; Rajat Ganguli & Ray Taras, 
Understanding E thnic Conflict: The International Dimension (2002), p. 28 
29 Jakc Snyder, From V oting to V iolence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, (2000), p. 181; see also 
Toft, “Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War” (2001), p. 2 
30
 Rajat Ganguli, & Ray Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict (2002), p.28; Crawford & 
Lippschutz, The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict” (1998), p. 8; Byman & van Evera, “Why They 
Fight…” (1998) p. 1-2; Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars (1999), p. 5-6 
31 They claim that whereas 17 states experienced civil war in 1989, only 11 did so in 1996. 
International conflict has almost vanished, and out of those conflicts that were ongoing in 1989-
1996, 26/37 were recurring or constant, i.e., had causes that originated in pre-1989 events. See 
Byman & van Evera (1998), p. 2, 22 
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causes of conflict, which have shifted from superpower rivalry to communal 
hegemonism and state weakness.32 
Many authors of the international change perspective argue that the change in nature of 
wars and conflict is due to processes that began much earlier than the Communist 
collapse, such as globalization, modernization, and relative deprivation.33 One argument 
is that sub-national groups, who feel unrepresented within their present political entity, 
will feel even more underrepresented if that entity becomes usurped into a yet larger 
framework.  
Fear Of The Future Lived Through The Past. 
David Lake & Donald Rothchild describe the constructivist framework as the bridge 
between primordialism and instrumentalism. Whereas ethnicity is seen as a primarily 
social phenomenon, a person’s identity still remains beyond the choice or control of 
each individual.34 As a group begins to fear for their existence, they act “rationally” to 
fend for its own survival, often leading to unwanted and highly irrational outcomes.35 
Lake and Rothchild write: 
As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series of dangerous and difficult 
to resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for 
tremendous violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, 
and the security dilemma take hold, the state is weakened, groups become fearful, 
and conflict becomes likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating 
within groups, reinforce these fears of physical insecurity and polarize the society. 
Political memories and myths and emotions also magnify these fears, driving 
groups further apart.36 
Many scholars who take this approach focus on explaining the conditions under which 
such “ethnic security dilemmas” can occur.37 In her book, Committing to Peace, 
                                                 
32 Byman & van Evera mention seven causes for conflict since WWII: collapse of post-Second 
World War empires; lack of regime legitimacy; state weakness; communal hegemonism; 
revolutionary ideology; aristocratic intransigence; superpower proxy wars. 
33 For globalization, see Mary Kaldor, New &  Old Wars (1999). For discussions on modernization, 
relative deprivation and economic decline, see Toft, “Indivisible Territory…” (2001), p. 2; Ron 
Lippschutz, “Seeking a State of One’s Own” 1998), p. 4, 12; Beverly Crawford, “The Causes of 
Cultural Conflict” (1998); Susan Woodward, Balk an Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War 
(1995); Jack Snyder, From V oting to V iolence (2000) 
34 Lake & Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears…” (1996), p. 4 
35 Walter attempts to explain this “mysterious pattern:” why rebels and leaders act in ways that 
appear to be self-defeating—rejecting settlement, returning to fruitless wars, fighting enormously 
costly battles? Are they irrational or is their range of rational choice limited by structural 
constraints? 
36 Lake & Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears…” (1996), p. 2 
37 Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, (spring 1993); 
Snyder & Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in Walter & Snyder (eds.), Civil Wars, 
Insecurity and Intervention (1999); Stephen Saideman, “Is the Pandora’s Box Half-Empty or Half-
Full?” (2001), p. 8. Another interesting discussion is the relationship between state collapse and the 
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Barbara Walter notes that some of the most fear-producing events in this aspect are 
government breakdown and collapse; isolation of a minority group within a larger 
ethnic community; a political power-balance shift from one group to the other; shifts in 
economic resources; and demobilization.38  
The constructivist framework is useful for this study because it can explain how 
identities are created and how violence is triggered.39 However, what makes it less 
useful for investigating absolutes is that it lacks an explanation of the relationship 
between ethnicity and territorial space. 
Understanding Ethnicity & Territory 
One author who writes about the relationship between ethnicity and territorial space is 
Monica Duffy Toft. According to Toft, violence follows from two conditions: a 
minority claim for secession, and a perception by the state that the territory in question 
is indivisible. In order for compromise to be possible in such conflicts at least one of 
these conditions must be absent.40 The key to predicting and understanding ethnic 
violence according to Toft, is thus the relationship that the different actors — ethnic 
groups and states — have with the disputed territory, and especially how two actors 
view control over the same piece of ground as indivisible: 
For ethnic groups territory is invariably tied to the group’s identity. Control over 
territory means a secure identity. For states, control over territory is directly linked 
to their physical survival. Where both ethnic groups and states calculate that they 
need to control the same piece of territory to guarantee their survival, a violent 
clash is likely to result.41 
Hence, whereas variations in settlement patterns explain variations in group capacity 
and legitimacy, which in turn predict variations in the likelihood that a group will risk 
violence to gain sovereignty, for the state the key question is whether the secession of 
one group will set a precedent for other groups, spurring a domino effect of 
secessions.42  
What is missing from Toft’s explanation however is the possibility that the state (as well 
as the ethnic group) may have “homeland” claims on the disputed territory, and not just 
“precedence concerns.” In the most noticeable absolute conflicts like Kosovo and Israel, 
                                                                                                                                               
security dilemma. Figueiro & Weingast ask if “state collapse” causes the security dilemma or if the 
security dilemma gives rise to state collapse. See Figueiredo & Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: 
Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict” (1997), p. 1 
38 Walter & Snyder, Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention (1999), Ch. 2 
39 See Rothchild & Wermester, “Third Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict Prevention,” 
Wermester & Sriram (eds.), From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of 
V iolent Conflict (forthcoming) 
40 Toft, “indivisible Territory…” (2001), p. 5 
41 ibid, p. 3 
42 ibid, p. 15-17 
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the state (and the ethnic group that comprises it) has more than precedence-setting 
concerns; it also has absolute and exclusivist demands. In these disputes conflicting 
demands on the territory have come about as a result of conquests and war that have 
created large refugee populations with memories of collective suffering. Although the 
pattern is unique in each individual conflict, combatants tend to be surrounded by 
patrons and partisans (often neighboring “kin” states). This makes it difficult at times to 
determine whether a conflict is internal or international. This has been the pattern in 
Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine and Kashmir.43 
The type of identity that we are concerned with here is that which is essentially 
intertwined with a sense of territorial belonging and shared ancestry. Ethnicity is seen 
here as different from the more generic concept of identity in the sense that “ethnies” 
can neither exist nor arise other than in relation to a specific territorial space (however 
distant).44 In his book Nations Against States, Gidon Gottlieb defines ethnic or national 
groups in such territorial terms when he writes that ethnic groups are “those collective 
entities in which prominent political spokesmen and personalities voice their claims in 
terms of independence; of self-determination or minority rights, of autonomy, or of 
secession.”45  
Many western scholars argue that ethnicity should be treated as just another type of 
“identity” (like gender, political affiliation, religion etc.). However, it is important to 
point out that whereas “western” identity may be possible to step out of, the type of 
identity that is experienced by people in an ethnic conflict is quite different and much 
more salient. This can be explained partly by the proximity of ethnic groups within a 
small space, but even more by the significance of a specific territorial origin to the 
identity of a group, as a function of having defended it from “intruders” in the past. The 
role of territory becomes an important component in the formation of national identities, 
through the symbolic aspects of a homeland and the way in which metaphysical and 
historical manifestations of territory contribute to feelings of territorial belonging.46  
But how can we account for these myths and metaphysical manifestations? Rejecting 
the more primordial elements of the ancient hatreds explanation, Stuart Kaufman 
focuses on the historical aspect in inter-group relationships, and especially on how 
myths and symbols are recycled and modified according to the needs of the 
contemporary context. Most “ancient hatreds,” claims Kaufman, are thus new constructs 
that are based on historic events that may be both real and mythical. These constructs, 
                                                 
43 Kosovo is not mentioned here because although recognizing “kinship,” the Albanian state has 
not taken an active role in representing the Kosovo Albanians. 
44 See Stephen Iwan Griffiths, Nationalism and E thnic Conflict, SIPRI Research Report No. 5 (Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 10-14; Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession (1999), p. 20 
45 Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State (1993), p. xii; see also Stephen Iwan Griffiths, (ibid) and 
Bartkus, (ibid) 
46 Some authors stress the importance of group size, capabilities or settlement patters: See Coakely, 
The Territorial Management of E thnic Conflict (1993); Toft, “Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War” 
(2001). Others, such as Goertz & Diehl (in Walter 2001) look at the value or importance of 
territory to the claimants. Also see Paul F Diehl, A Roadmap to War: Territorial Dimensions of 
International Conflict (1999), p. 3, 4; Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity (1996); Kliot & Waterman (1983), 
p. 115, 120; Margaret Moore, National Self-determination and Secession (1998), p. 2 
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according to Kaufman’s “symbolic politics” approach, determine the relationship 
between groups and the likelihood of violent conflict.47 The idea of ethnic symbolism 
combines the logic of the ancient hatreds, manipulative elites, and stories of economic 
rivalry. Kaufman writes that three elements are needed for mobilization to take place:  
while manipulative elites use ethnicity as tools to gain support and solidarity, such 
campaigns will have little effect on the targeted population unless there is a real and 
perceived conflict of interest at work as well as mythically based feelings of hostility 
that can be tapped into. Without a perceived conflict of interest, people have no reason 
to mobilize. Without “emotional commitment based on hostile feeling” they lack 
incentive to do so, and without leadership they are often incapable of organizing 
themselves collectively.48 Ethnic wars differ, explains Kaufman, in the extent to which 
each of these factors is primarily to blame: 
In some cases, prejudice and hostility are so strong that they result in violence 
almost as soon as the opportunity arises. In these cases of mass-led violence, 
theories about ancient hatreds seem particularly appropriate. In other cases it is 
incumbent leaders who play on ethnic prejudice to provoke hostility and violence. 
Such cases of elite-led violence seem more explicable in terms of manipulative 
leaders. Either way, war results from a process in which extremist politics and 
insecurity mutually reinforce each other in an escalatory spiral.49 
Prejudiced symbolic politics and insecurity, he explains, feed each other: “Modern” 
hatreds feed into the security dilemma, which then gives rise to hostility and violence. 
As history is turned into symbolism, spiritual commemorations and myths of 
martyrdom, people are led to do, what in the eyes of onlookers are “irrational” things.50 
The tragic element, writes Kaufman, is that “the groups are spurred by their 
mythologies to define their security in mutually incompatible ways when more modest 
definitions on both sides would permit mutual security instead of a spiral of insecurity 
and violence.”51  
The Symbolic Politics framework is useful when trying to understand how territorial 
absolutes emerge and how conflict over absolute space can be triggered as well as how 
it becomes so indivisible. An ethnic security dilemma arises when groups who claim the 
same territory, treat it as mutually exclusive. In cases where groups fight to dominate 
their own self-identified homeland, these myths become even stronger, making the 
prospects for successful negotiations even worse: 
Outside observers usually argue in such cases that a compromise is possible, but 
that is the tragedy of the ethnic security dilemma: the parties cannot agree to 
                                                 
47 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds (2002) 
48 ibid, p. 12 
49 ibid, p. 12-13 
50 In contrast to the traditional security dilemma where parties prefer not to fight, in Kaufman’s 
ethnic security dilemma the sides are openly hostile and perfectly willing to fight. See Kaufman, 
Modern Hatreds (2002), p. 34; see also Jedlicki about the Polish-Ukrainian relationship: Jerzy Jedlicki, 
“Historical Memory as a Source of Conflict in Eastern Europe” Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 32 (1999) 
51 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds (2002), p. 36 
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compromise because their security needs are defined by their national myths—and 
defined so that security for one side automatically means insecurity for the other. 
In short, it is not uncertainty but hostile myths that allow ethnic entrepreneurs to 
justify violence against a rival group.52  
Two things are important as we look closer at absolutes in negotiation and conflict 
management: First, whereas ethnicity and communal attachments can be stronger for 
some ethnic groups than for others the difference in these sentiments stems not from 
variations in “primordial ties” or “backwardness,” but from the extent to which groups 
have been subjected to continuous threats and conflict throughout their history (compare 
for example Serbs with Swedes). Salient “territorial ethnicity” is seen here as the result 
of hostility and suffering endured collectively when defending their “homeland” over 
generations. Proximity of groups is thus not enough for conflict over a territorial 
absolute to emerge if, as Kaufman explains, the threat to the territory is coming from an 
ethnic group other than the one from which the threat emanated in the past.53 
Second, (and in reverse of the previous argument) the difficulty to resolve territorial 
absolutes through negotiation can partly be attributed to the fact that it usually involves 
at least two very proximate groups who are fighting over a very small piece of territory. 
In most societies that experience conflict with territorial absolutes, ethnic groups live 
very close together, as in Belfast, where only the street names tell the difference. Any 
option for the resolution of the conflict other than sharing – which is declared out of the 
question by the parties – would require the permanent exclusion of one the parties to 
that land. This is the dilemma created by territorial absolutes for negotiation. 
 
Analysis 
A. Argument 
Conflicts over absolute space are zero-sum by definition, as the claim of one party is 
often made in terms of the exclusion of the other.54 Absolute issues often evade 
successful negotiation because any acknowledgment of the other party’s claim or 
agreement to settle the question of ownership in favor of the opponent becomes 
existential, equivalent to the renouncing of one’s own identity.55  
                                                 
52 Kaufman, “Ethnic Violence, Symbolic Politics, and the Security Dilemma” (2001), p. 7 
53 See Kaufman, Modern Hatreds (2002) 
54 Ron Hassner writes that two parameters distinguish sacred (absolute) space in relation to other 
space: first, the centrality of the place in a group’s spiritual landscape; and second, exclusivity, the 
measure of the degree to which access to the sacred space and behavior within it are circumscribed, 
monitored and sanctioned—thereby also separating members from non-members: See Hassner, 
“Conflict over Sacred Space” (2001) 
55 Toft, “Indivisible Territory…” (2001), p. 3; territory is invariably tied to a group’s identity and the 
key to predicting ethnic violence is how the different actors—ethnic groups and states—view 
territory. 
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Disputed land becomes transformed into an “infinitely intangible” space that no longer 
makes sense in pieces or parts, but only in its entirety. Because of the close connection 
between the absolute and ethnic, religious and/or symbolic identity, such spaces take on 
nearly divine character, insulating them from partition into sub-units that could allow 
for bargaining and compromise.56 Paul Diehl writes: 
While divisible aspects may open up the basis for compromise and territorial 
division, symbolic and religious attachment to land does not allow for 
compromise, in which case the conflict becomes more protracted and violent.57  
The argument made here is that the extreme difficulty encountered in the negotiation of 
ethnopolitical conflicts over territory can partly be explained by the degree to which the 
contestants perceive the disputed space in absolute terms. For the purpose of this study 
an absolute can be defined as a disputed space that, through myths, symbols and/or 
spiritual practice or beliefs, has become so intrinsic to the identity of a group that it can 
only be treated as an indivisible “whole.”  
The meaning of an absolute stake draws on, but goes beyond, the normally used notion 
of an “indivisible.”58 Indivisibility implies the end point on a continuum of varying 
degrees of “divisibility.” If the right formula can be reached by substitution or 
exchange, a degree of divisibility may be added and introduced into the negotiations, 
making settlement possible.  
Absolutes stakes however, are not fungible: they cannot be exchanged for something 
else (like security)59, paid off by outside parties (compensation), or substituted for (by 
territory somewhere else).60 
When neither one of the parties is willing to make territorial concessions anywhere 
close to the magnitude required by the other side, negotiations may seem like a waste of 
time. Experiments with democratic or participatory proceedings or power sharing are 
unlikely to work in a situation where parties regard sharing as out of the question.61 
Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl suggest that the resolution of territorial disputes with high 
relational importance (meaning high emotional attachments) needs more than a division 
of land area into equal pieces: 
                                                 
56 See Anthony D. Smith, “Chosen Peoples,” Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity, (1996), pp. 189-196; 
Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict” (1998); Hassner, “Conflict over Sacred Space…” 
(2001), p. 46 
57 Diehl, A Roadmap to War (1999), p. 16 
58 Indivisibility or intangibility is also referred to as “exclusivity” in territorial disputes. Groups see 
themselves as the exclusive owners to a territory and all other groups are seen as usurpers. 
59 As in the case of the Security for land offered to Israel in the 1978 Camp David agreement over 
Sinai. 
60 See Hassner “Conflict over Sacred Space…” (2001) 
61 Jedlicki, “Historical Memory…”(1999), p. 19; see Snyder, From V oting to V iolence (2000); Byman & 
Van Evera, “Why They Fight…” (1998), p. 48 
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It may be that security interests can be satisfied without a territorial change. Yet it 
also may be that the interests of the protagonists are incompatible such that any 
division of the disputed land will be unacceptable to one side or the other.62 
1.  Absolutes in Morality 
We often talk about absolutes in relation to morality or value and in its most general 
usage it is simply understood as something that cannot be compromised. According to 
the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, the absolute is defined in the following terms:   
That which has an unconditioned existence, not conditioned by, relative to, or 
dependent on anything else. […]the whole of things, conceived as unitary, as 
spiritual, as self-knowing (at least in part via the human mind), and as rationally 
intelligible, as finite things, considered individually, are not.63 
Moral absolutism is related to a deontological position in ethics, which takes the view 
that certain kinds of actions are intrinsically right or wrong regardless of their 
consequences. However, whereas a deontological position may accept that even 
intrinsically wrongful acts may at times be necessary in order to prevent certain 
circumstances, absolutism would reject such a claim and hold that “wrongness” can 
never be overridden by any consideration of the consequences. The absolutist position 
also often corresponds to common traditional religious values with roots in the Ten 
Commandments.64 
Two points stand out from this discussion, as they relate to territorial absolutes. First, 
we are reminded that an absolute value is a matter of perception and may therefore vary 
from one individual to the other, and from one negotiating party to the other. However, 
for individuals with strong convictions of absolutes, the convictions are transformed 
into reality by the manner in which they govern and constrain attitudes and behaviors. 
In a negotiation situation, these constraints play into the process, influencing decision-
making, bargaining, and the range of possible alternatives relevant to the outcome.65 
Second, the philosophy debate also seems to indicate that any question with high 
enough stakes could potentially be made “absolute” (or non-negotiable) in the 
perception of the negotiators. Hence, according to this view, the “substance” of the 
absolute value is irrelevant to the essence of an “absolute.” This would imply that 
territorial absolutes should be no more difficult to resolve through negotiations than any 
other issue that has taken on absolute value for the parties. 
                                                 
62 Goertz & Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (1992), p. 132 
63 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University Press 1995, also at 
http://www.xrefer.com, 7/12/02 
64 Take the discussion between Jesus and the Pharisees over whether or not you could rescue your 
donkey from a pit on Shabbat. The Pharisees hold on to the absolutist view that no work can be 
performed during Shabbat regardless of the circumstances, whereas Jesus’ answer is 
consequentialist in nature, in that it depends on the circumstances. 
65 See Tim Hicks, “Another Look at Identity-Based Conflict: The Roots of Conflict in the 
Psychology of Consciousness” Negotiation Journal (2001) 
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But are “absolutes” just another way of explaining “high stakes,” or can the specific 
characteristics of a territorial absolute determine the success or failure of negotiations? 
There is far too little emphasis on absolute phenomena in the negotiation literature to be 
able to draw any significant conclusions. However, understanding absolutes better 
requires better knowledge about the structural context of conflict where absolutes 
emerge, and the special dynamics created by ethnic territorial conflict. 
Resolving Absolutes – A Paradox 
So how could these conflicts be dealt with? The international community is clearly 
faced with both normative and practical challenges: normatively we want to protect 
ethnic minorities from encroachment by the state; practically, not every ethnic 
community is fit to be a state.66  
Since the 1960’s, when the concept of self-determination was invented, the international 
relations debate has increasingly gone from a realpolitik focus on power and 
capabilities, to a ‘moral-politik’ focus on international conventions and norms.67 
However, in spite of this development, we still need new flexible solutions to resolve 
some of the most difficult and protracted conflicts of our time. Unfortunately it is also 
conspicuously void of ideas about how such solutions should be found.68 One the one 
hand the sovereignty norm in international law protects states from disintegration. On 
the other hand, the self-determination norm and the principle of democracy and political 
participation, often support claims for independence from certain ethnic groups or 
nations.  
The most popular solutions for ethnopolitical secessionist conflict are power-sharing 
systems, or various forms of devolutions of power. Bringing political decisions closer to 
the people may in fact help in those cases where minority groups are facing 
discrimination or exclusion by the majority. However, combatants in disputes over 
absolute space would often much rather die than share even an inch of their sacred land 
with the enemy. Thus, the argument made here is that most of these prescriptions are 
unsuitable for intra-state conflict over territory, especially when the dispute concerns 
space seen as absolute, that the parties are unwilling to share. 
In conflicts over territorial absolutes, the stronger party technically has four “extreme” 
alternatives with regard to the termination of the conflict. First, it can strive to achieve 
assimilation of the ethnic minority into the dominant culture. Second, it can carry out 
ethnic transfer so as to clear the disputed land from members of the other group. Third, 
it can attempt genocide—either real or symbolic—to simply eradicate the other. Finally, 
it can allow secession (either out of weakness or compassion) and the creation of an 
independent state. Whereas assimilation is unlikely to work in a situation where identity 
can be considered “part of the stake,” transfer has a poor record despite some claims to 
the contrary,69 and secession—if carried out—will most likely be stymied by the side 
                                                 
66 See Gottlieb, Nation Against State (1993), p. 2  
67 David Rappoport, “The Importance of Space…” (1996), p. 8 
68 Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy (1997); Ayissi, “Territorial Conflicts…” (2001) 
69 See Chaim Kaufmann, “When all else fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the 
Twentieth Century” (1998); Nicholas Sambanis, Partition As a Solution to E thnic War: An E mpirical 
 15
that looses in the deal. Further, these extreme solutions would only be possible if one 
side had all the power and the other side had none - but this is rarely ever the case. Even 
if one of these alternatives were carried out “successfully,” chances are that the 
suffering inflicted would generate new myths of martyrdom that could justify the next 
cycle of revenge.  
Thus, although the combatants would certainly prefer total victory and the “eradication” 
of the enemy, findings show that internal territorial conflicts seldom end in either 
outright victory or defeat. Rather they tend to become protracted struggles that either 
continue to linger for years, or they are eventually resolved through some form of 
compromise.70  Zartman has shown that such conflicts are amenable to negotiated 
solutions when the parties find themselves in a hurting stalemate, where the costs of 
continuing the violence exceeds the potential gains from entering into negotiations.71 
Since neither side is in the position to win through an escalation of hostilities, 
negotiating becomes the only way out and compromise becomes necessary. In this case, 
the only alternative that can offer something to both sides while not depriving either of 
symbolic ownership of the land is some form of asymmetric devolution, such as 
political autonomy.72  
The paradox however, is that autonomy is often claimed to be an unstable alternative for 
secessionist conflicts and sometimes considered only as a trajectory towards future 
independence.73 While some scholars claim that all negotiated autonomies will 
ultimately lead to independence in the long run; others explain the tendency for states to 
“usurp” autonomous regions as soon as the opportunity presents itself.74 This happens 
because such autonomy is often neither preferred, nor welcomed by either the ethnic 
                                                                                                                                               
Critique of The Theoretical L iterature (1999); Rhada Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition” Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 76, no 1. Whereas Chaim Kaufmann argues that transfer has prevented major war on an 
international level in several well-known cases such as between Pakistan and India, between Israel 
and the Arab states, and between Ireland and the UK, Kumar and Sambanis argue against this 
claim. The result of those transfers was the development of severe protracted conflicts with 
absolute characteristics. The Kashmir, Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts are all the 
direct result of the “transfers” (including refugee flows) that took place during a major war. See also 
Daniel Byman, “Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon,” Security 
Studies, (Autumn) vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1-29 
70 Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, (2002); Toft, “Indivisible 
Territory…” (2001), p. 41 
71 Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (1989) 
72 Asymmetric devolution is described by Coakley as “territorial asymmetric distributions of power in 
which the center permanently cedes power to the sub-state level.” Autonomy would give territorial 
sovereignty to the ethnic group while still not denying the state the ownership and control. See 
Coakley The Territorial Management of E thnic Conflict (1993), p. 18 
73 See Rothchild & Lake, “Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlement,” (forthcoming), p. 
2, 17, 24; Svante Cornell, “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflict in Theoretical 
Perspective” (2002); Hassner, “Conflict over Sacred Space” (2001); Gottlieb, Nations Against State 
(1993), p. 32, 46; Kaufman, “Ethnic Violence…” (2001) 
74 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy Sovereignty and Self-Determination (1996) 
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group or the state. It is born out of a costly stalemate, and only out of their failure to 
gain what in their perception is “rightfully theirs.”  
Despite its weaknesses however, autonomy lies somewhere in the middle between the 
three extremes of assimilation, transfer or secession, three alternatives that seem 
“doomed” in territorial absolute conflict, as they solve the problem only to the 
satisfaction of one side. Hence, autonomy may perhaps be the only way that conflicts 
over absolute space can be managed, in the absence of the ability to determine the “final 
status” of such disputed land. 
An advocate for autonomy solutions, Ruth Lapidoth, explains that autonomy 
agreements are granted in cases where self-determination is not an option, and where 
minority rights or guarantees of equality are not satisfactory.75 According to this view 
autonomy should be the perfect solution for handling conflicts over absolute space. 
However, the question concerns not only whether autonomy should be granted or not, 
but also what type of autonomy that is appropriate in each case.76 Even in the case of 
disputed land, Lapidoth contends that personal and functional autonomy, with no 
territorial attributes, can do the job.77 But functional powers are not likely to work if 
parties are fighting and dying for control over a very specific, delineated piece of 
territory, such as in Kosovo, Israel, or Northern Ireland. The failure of the 
implementation of the Oslo agreement showed that it is highly unlikely that an ethnic 
group in an absolute territorial dispute will accept administrative and political freedoms 
without a clear link to the territory in which they reside. 
It is clear that a political autonomy regime can only be effective in managing absolute 
space if it comes about through a mutually acceptable negotiated agreement. However, 
while studies have shown that combatants with territorial goals are no less likely to 
initiate negotiations than the parties in non-territorial conflicts, they have also found that 
they are much less successful in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement. Suspecting 
that the factors that influence parties to come to the negotiation table may be quite 
different from those factors that influence success or failure of negotiations, Barbara 
Walter found that intra-state combatants with territorial goals were 20 percent less likely 
to reach a mutually acceptable settlement than those with non-territorial goals.78 Hence, 
this decreases the chances for mutually acceptable autonomy arrangements to ever come 
about. 
Walter, who had initially hypothesized that territorial stakes should be easier to manage 
than non-territorial stakes, is surprised by this finding. One explanation, she suggests, 
could be that past failures to negotiate have pushed the combatants to inflate their 
territorial claims and push for separation. The argument made here however, is the 
reverse: in negotiations over space perceived as absolute by the combatants, it is the 
nature of the disputed land and the exclusivist goals of the combatants in relation to it, 
that make negotiations so difficult. The complex dynamics created in such negotiations 
                                                 
75 Lapidoth, Autonomy (1997) 
76 See Yash Ghai, “Autonomy as a Strategy for Diffusing Conflict,” in Druckman & Stern (eds.), 
International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (2000) 
77 Lapidoth, Autonomy (1997) 
78 Walter, Committing to Peace (2002), p. 82 
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seem to present mediators with a “worst case scenario” in terms of finding final 
solutions that are acceptable to both sides. 
Negotiating Absolutes 
In conflicts over absolute space the parties negotiate only because they are stuck. If the 
stronger side had all the power, the conflict could have been “resolved.”79 The parties 
are locked into a mutually hurting stalemate where the costs of continuing the conflict 
are higher than talking and thus, negotiation becomes the only option. What the parties 
in such a situation often forget is that if you cannot take something by force you have to 
purchase it, and what you do in negotiations is in fact determining the price.80 However, 
since absolutes cannot be purchased at any price (in the perception of the participants), 
deadlock often becomes protracted, devastating and rigid.  
2. “Absolute” Dynamics 
The parties in internal territorial conflicts are typically an ethnic group and a state, 
naturally tilting the military balance of power substantially in the direction of the state. 
Yet, states in such situations are rarely able to completely crush their opposition. The 
weaker party’s strength is derived from the fact that it is able to deliver enough pain to 
the stronger party to make the situation more costly than the potential gains that could 
be gained (by the stronger party) from negotiating. The weaker party’s relative strength 
can be drawn from several sources, including the methods and means used for the 
struggle; the strength of their commitment; the legal and moral opinions of the 
international community, and the power gained from participating in negotiation.  
In spite of having less military capacity, the weaker side can often make the largest, 
most effective, and most well equipped armies practically defenseless.81 Whereas a state 
typically uses conventional warfare, such as tanks and helicopters, rebels frequently use 
more unconventional means, such as guerrilla tactics and civilian dress. At the 
beginning of the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987-88, this was exactly the dilemma 
facing the Israeli Defense Forces. Like most powerful armies, the Israelis were not 
trained in “mob control” or policing when they were confronted by little boys throwing 
mostly nothing but rocks. The resulting media coverage of Israeli brutalities was part of 
a planned strategy of the West Bank Palestinian leadership until more militant factions 
gained control over the uprising. 
Another source of power for the weak can be their willingness to suffer and their 
symbolic commitment to the land. This has sometimes been explained by the 
“homeland” theory by scholars, which posits that the side that is fighting for their 
                                                 
79 This situation can be illustrated by a story about a Russian farmer who was granted a wish by 
God. However, said God, whatever would be granted to the farmer, would also be granted – but in 
the double – to his worst enemy. “Then,” said the farmer, “cut out my left eye.” (Compliments to 
Paul Meertz, PIN-IIASA/Clingendael Institute.) 
80 Zartman, “Initiatives in Negotiation,” Conference, SAIS April 24th 
81 The Vietnam War serves as one of the most revealing example where a strong army has not been 
able to crush their much weaker counterpart.  
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“home turf” or ‘ancestral land’ will accept much higher sacrifices, than those for whom 
the land is more distant, physically or emotionally.82 Palestinian suicide bombers or 
Japanese Kamikaze pilots are examples of such commitment.  
A third source of power can be found in internationally accepted norms and practice. 
Ethnic groups such as the Palestinians can evoke international opinions communicated 
through the United Nations (Resolutions 223 and 338), or through declarations of the 
international legal community. Regionally concentrated ethnic groups often invoke the 
“majority principle,” the right to self-determination and political participation, rights of 
indigenous peoples, or other norms of the international community that may favor their 
claim.  
By negotiating, states foreclose the military option and thereby relinquish an important 
part of their power to the weaker party, essentially “admitting” that they cannot win. 
The paradox in negotiations is that the weak are allowed to confront the strong and still 
gain something from the talks that should not be possible if weakness and strength were 
all that mattered.83 When entering negotiations an ethnic group (whose claim the state 
often does not recognize), will have veto power over any agreement that does not please 
them, as well as the power to provoke a conflict or encounter. Other dynamics that 
influence the positional commitment of negotiators are the perceived value of the stake; 
the degree of freedom or accountability of the negotiator;84 the support of the domestic 
constituency; and the toughness dilemma.  
Because the absolute territorial conflict is between an ethnic group and a state there is a 
risk that the state will attempt to dominate negotiations from its position of strength and 
as the official sovereign “owner” of the disputed territory. Too much strength on the 
part of the stronger side can lead to an imposed agreement that will either not be 
accepted by the weaker side or will fail during its implementation. Within the 
negotiation setting this is described as the “toughness dilemma,” and it is a consequence 
of the veto power that the weaker side has over the final outcome.85 In ongoing 
negotiations over the implementation of autonomy agreements, the logic of the 
toughness dilemma will continue to directly affect the prospects for successfully 
managing conflicts over absolute space.86 
                                                 
82 Goertz and Diehl found that states are likely to be tougher when defending a territory that is part 
of their “homeland.” See Goertz & Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (1992), p. 88  
83 Zartman & Berman, The practical Negotiator (1982) 
84 Negotiators tend to make high demands and few concessions if they believe that their 
constituents are anxious to win. Accountability – which is the extent to which the negotiators can 
be rewarded or punished by their constituents for their performance – has shown to slow 
concession making and enhance contentious behavior. Logically, negotiators higher up on the 
decision-making ladder or those who are elected are more likely to be more flexible. See Pruitt & 
Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (1993), pp. 56 
85 The “toughness dilemma,” refers to the observation that when parties play tough they increase 
their chances of getting an agreement closer to their position, while simultaneously decreasing their 
chances of getting any agreement at all. See Zartman, Preventive Negotiation (2001), p. 10-11; See 
Pruitt & Carnevale, (ibid), p. 47 
86 The talks that paralleled the implementation of the Oslo Agreement provide an example of a 
situation where the weaker side felt powerless in determining its course. 
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Questions Regarding Absolutes 
In order to understand the complexity of negotiating absolute space a look at the 
mechanisms of values and perceptions that accompany each conflict is required. There 
are still some very basic questions about absolutes that need to be answered, such as: 
! Can absolutes negotiated?  
! If so, what is the nature of the process? 
! What are the dynamics that make absolutes so difficult to resolve? 
! How does sacred space emerge, and for what reasons? 
! Can a territorial absolute be changed into a divisible space? 
These (and many more) questions have yet to be answered about sacred space, absolute 
territorial conflict and ethnicity. Below three dimensions are analyzed in order to 
understand the influence of territorial absolutes on the negotiation process. 
First, the interplay between territory and identity; how values affect stakes and how 
identity combined with territory leads to existential questions about group survival. 
Second, the legacies of collective suffering and revived myths; how present fears play a 
role in reviving old hatreds, which in turn gives rise to violence and atrocities, and how 
memories of past events creates a problem for the negotiation process. 
Third, the role of symbolism and religion in creating the indivisibility of absolute space; 
the cultivation of ethnic election and its consequences, and the role of “false 
righteousness” in creating stereotypes about “self” and the “other.” 
The Nature of Absolutes 
3. Territory and Identity 
In most cases the difficulty inherent in negotiating certain issues is not fixed, but 
depends on the stakes attached to it by the parties. Stakes can be described as “those 
things that matter to the parties–costs and benefits that each [party] faces as a particular 
issue is handled early rather than later.”87 Stakes determine the value of things and set 
the terms of trade. The value determines the “nature of the stake,” whether it is 
integrative or distributive; divisible or indivisible, tangible or intangible. Values are 
“ostensibly true” — thus, also the subject of perceptions.88 
During negotiations, the most immediate challenge facing third parties and mediators is 
to get the contenders to move from a perception of the stakes in terms of value, to an 
understanding of it in terms of interests. Since interests are rarely identical, positive sum 
outcomes can be created where the interests of both sides are taken into account. In 
other words, negotiation seeks to move the parties from a zero-sum perception of the 
stakes to a positive-sum or integrative approach, by reframing issues, using side-
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payments, or re-evaluating interests (ranking issues). Zartman has called this a move 
from “value-claiming” to “value-creating”, or from “competing claims” to “joint 
gains.”89 By reframing the issue in terms of joint gains or shared problems, parties can 
come to see their needs and interests as compatible. By using side-payments or 
compensation, mediators or third parties can compensate parties for losses by providing 
something else making up for that loss, such as security or land somewhere else. The re-
evaluation of interests refers to looking at the underlying issue to see the needs behind a 
claim, to see whether those needs could be met in some other way.  
However, these transformations assume that all stakes can be either re-evalued or paid 
off, that interests are never completely identical, that cooperative strategies work once 
employed, and that parties who have suffered heavy losses will still be open for 
compromise. From our earlier observation of absolutes we know that they are often 
“infinitely” zero-sum, therefore clearly lacking this flexibility. Dean Pruitt & Peter 
Carnevale explain that such situations, where win-win solutions are useless, can occur if 
the underlying concerns of both parties are completely identical.90 
Besides the actual (or perceived) value, the substance of an issue might also determine 
its nature, or divisibility, which in turn influences its prospects for being resolved 
through negotiation. Roy Licklider notes that the nature of issues is important, but that 
its impact on the outcome is still largely unclear.91  Some issues may have a 
predetermined nature that might influence the outcome, such as being tangible or 
intangible, abstract and symbolic or hard and concrete. Traditionally issues were often 
described as either “hard” or “soft.”92 Whereas hard issues were those that concerned 
military power and security, soft issues were those that wouldn’t “kill” (at least not in 
the short-term), such as social or economic issues. The level of negotiation difficulty 
was partly attributed to the value of the stakes, but could also be closely related to the 
immediate risks that the parties might face should they not reach an agreement. 
By itself, and in relation to interstate conflict, territory is known as the single most 
prominent issue that escalates disputes to the point of war, thus a “hard” stake. 
Territorial disputes have also shown to be much more escalatory, more violent, and 
more likely to experience military responses than non-territorial disputes.93 Further, 
intrastate conflicts over territory are not likely to be resolved through either force or 
persuasion, and will more often end in a cease-fire or stalemate than in victory or a 
lasting peace settlement.94 Compared to non-ethnic intra-state conflicts, Nicholas 
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Sambanis found that ethnopolitical intrastate conflicts are more enduring and reach 
higher levels of violence, i.e., they are more difficult to resolve through negotiations.95  
However, other findings relating to inter-state territorial conflicts, show that territory is 
often easy to negotiate compared to other issues, due to its tangible and divisible 
nature.96 This paradox reveals that territorial issues may “act” much more divisible in 
inter-state conflicts than when they appear in an internal or an inter-ethnic context 
where stakes and values are apparently higher. Writing that identity conflicts over land 
are somehow in a “grey-zone between soft and hard,” Ayissi confirms this ambiguous 
nature.97 He explains the difficulty to be determined by the intensity of the claiming 
groups’ parochial feelings, the density of committed power and engagement, contextual 
factors (such as external support), and the degree to which identity is intertwined with 
threats to security and prosperity.98  
a. Intrinsic or Relational Value of Space 
Goertz & Diehl write that territory can have two types of values to parties: intrinsic 
value related to its resources, or relational value, connected to its meaning “in the eyes 
of the beholder.”99 This, they claim can explain why the value of a given piece of 
territory can vary according to the perceptions of the different groups or states involved 
in a dispute. Whereas intrinsic importance refers to material assets or resources that are 
present regardless of whose perspective is taken into account, relational importance 
refers to its functional or immaterial aspects such as centrality, or “homeland.”100 The 
relational value is made up of characteristics that can differ widely between different 
states or groups. Thus, when these values clash over the same territory it is likely to 
result high levels of violence.101 
In addition to a territory’s centrality, the relational value is determined three further 
dimensions. First, the ethnic composition of the population may give states reasons to 
see a territory as highly valuable and as a result place claims on neighboring states in 
which their kin resides.102 Second, and related to ethnic considerations, the history of a 
land may have enormous value for a state or a group, a dimension that is often 
reinforced by aspects of cultural practices and religious traditions.103  A third dimension 
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of relational value is what Goertz & Diehl call the “territorial importance.” They explain 
that beyond the intrinsic value of territory there seems to be idiosyncratic and 
sometimes irrational benefits that are derived just from owning a particular piece of 
land.104 A prime example of a failure to take such idiosyncratic value into account, they 
say, was the division of Palestine after the Second World War, which consequently 
resulted in catastrophe. 
But what causes groups to mobilize to claim these values? Some scholars argue that the 
extent to which an ethnic group makes territorial demands on the state is related to the 
absolute size of the group and to the pattern of territorial distribution and settlement 
patterns of the group itself. Coakely claims that a group’s territorial claims become 
stronger as (1) the group increases as a proportion of the population of its territory and 
(2) the proportion of the total membership of the group within this territory increases.105 
Many scholars would try to show that territory is only a symbolic aspect of conflict; a 
result of other more “serious” underlying conditions. Claims to territory, they argue, 
may come about because of a sense of relative deprivation, political discrimination or 
other grievances against the center of power. However, a striking observation in relation 
to conflict over absolute space is that this explanation can be turned on its head: It 
seems that a conflict over territorial absolute is the direct result of a conflicting claim to 
the same land – not primarily defined in terms of its resources. Thus, the ensuing 
relationship between the parties is constructed on the basis of how they view each other 
as competitors to the same strip of territory. Typically, as a result of one party 
dominating the other, – such as the Serbs have done in Kosovo, or the British have done 
in Northern Ireland – political discrimination and grievances follow. 
b. Identity and Survival 
Similar to territory, identity issues in communal conflicts also show some ambiguous 
findings regarding its nature. Barbara Walter claims that contrary to common 
assumptions, identity has not proved to be more difficult than other issues to resolve 
through negotiations.106 While ethnicity may be considered simple to accommodate by 
itself (when the issue concerns minority rights and cultural guarantees), the struggle 
tends to become one of survival when it is closely connected to a homeland or space. 
Toft argues that intra-state conflicts over territory are invariably ethnic and that the 
stakes therefore are raised for both parties; whereas for the rebels the struggle becomes 
existential, for the government, it becomes a fear of precedent setting as well as a fear of 
damage to the sovereignty of the state. While these fears are not likely to diminish with 
the outbreak of violence, the death of kin would also intensify an ethnic group’s 
attachment to, and determination to free, their homeland.  
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Invariably, it seems to be the relationship between territory and ethnicity that can help 
explain why combatants are willing to spill blood over disputed territory that may have 
relatively little material value compared to the costs of fighting.107 But even if this may 
help us understand how territorial absolutes are constructed, it does not tell us anything 
about how they should be negotiated. Unfortunately, accounts about such negotiation 
are few and not too promising. In his article called “Self and Space: Negotiating a 
Future from the Past,” William Zartman talks about two now familiar types of relations 
that influence the negotiation process: whether the issue is perceived in distributive or 
zero-sum terms, or in integrative or positive-sum terms. While distributive notions 
invite solutions that sustain the zero-sum nature of the conflict, integrative solutions are 
created to “expand, penetrate and overlap” without doing so at the expense of the 
other.108 Unfortunately for the prospects of resolving absolutes, he also notes that 
territory is traditionally and “archetypically” zero-sum in nature, as a result of old 
notions of bounded ownership over space. Zartman also explains how definitions of self 
and space (or identity and territory) can go from being “soft” to being “hard,” defined in 
zero-sum terms. This change comes especially when it runs into “the Other,” – the 
identities and spaces of one’s neighbors.109 Although such a transformation does not 
happen overnight, the experience of the exploding hatred in the Balkans in the 1990s 
tells us that it can happen very quickly, and that when it does, it is deadly. A much 
slower but nevertheless powerful transformation took place among the Palestinian 
population in the old British Mandate of Palestine, as European Jews began to arrive 
and settle in that territory. Transformations such as these beg the question whether such 
processes could be reversed.   
If people can be changed through socialization, it would imply that strong feelings of 
ethnicity are “context bound” and not only place-bound. Ethnicity (or identity) is 
important for conflicts in that it influences how a conflict is fought, the level of violence 
tolerated by the parties, and the degree of difficulty entailed in managing or resolving 
it.110 In order for a combination of territory and ethnicity to lead to conflict however, 
there has to be a history of ethnic rivalry or collective suffering that, when recalled, feed 
the myths that justify violence against the “Other.” 
c. Proposition 1 
# The more territory is understood in terms of identity 
and ethnicity, the more difficult it is to negotiate. 
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Collective Suffering and Resuscitated Myths  
What complicates ethnic conflicts over territory is that the parties do not only have 
conflicting views about the ownership of a piece of territory but also an extremely 
hostile relationship. Latent memories of former persecution and suffering at the hands 
of the other help motivate the present strife through the activation of negative enemy 
stereotypes: 
[S]oon the worst recollections of old enmity will overshadow the experience of 
peaceful everyday life. The symbol industry starts working full steam: one must 
rename streets, change flags and anthems, write proper schoolbooks, destroy some 
monuments and erect new ones, imitate old uniforms, restitute historical myths: in 
brief, shape the nation’s memory, language, sentiments and dreams. Dubravka 
Ugresic calls this kind of revolution a “terror of oblivion” associated with “a terror 
of recollection” (Ugresic, 1998)111 
Although the above paragraph referred specifically to Northern Ireland and the former 
Yugoslavia, the terror of hate campaigns and stereotypes seem all too familiar. 
Negotiation tries to work away at these problems, but as long as the parties see the 
disputed territory in absolute and exclusivist terms, they will have little incentive to 
decrease their hostility.  
The exclusivist attachment and control over the space where one’s national identity was 
formed helps define the lines between “self” and the “other,”112 effectively preventing 
the concept of bi-national, or democratic entities, and the notion of shared space.113  
Fears, as well as the resulting hostility, rise as a result of symbolic events that revive the 
myths that appeal to ethnic stereotypes.114 Minor events, like the publication of the 
Serbian “Historians’ Memorandum,”115 are defined as mortal threats to group survival, 
ancient disasters are reflected in current threats, and violent methods are promoted as 
the only way to save a group from catastrophe.116  
A number of scholars who study group rationalist behavior have found it odd that 
ordinary people can be led to carry out such horrendous atrocities in those contexts.117 
Some would claim that they are in the interest of the people who commit them. 
However, Kaufman writes that the explanation is based more on psychological factors 
than on logic. Some people will naturally react extremely strongly to the impetus of 
ethnic symbolism, especially when created for that purpose. However, argues Kaufman, 
this can still not explain how dismemberment and torture can become morally 
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acceptable.118 Atrocities, he says, have to be based on two components in people’s 
minds: First, a mythical belief that the opponent is engaging in similar atrocities, and 
second, the normative view that retaliatory atrocities are morally acceptable. Typically 
ethnic violence is always defined defensively, by the claim that the other group is trying 
to take something that is “rightfully ours.” Atrocities therefore have to be justified by 
the claim that committing them is a legitimate way to defend what is “rightfully 
ours.”119   
What activates these hatreds and under what circumstances does history remain 
dormant?  Past events are crucial say some scholars, in activating old myths that then 
play into contemporary nationalist rhetoric.120 Under such circumstances, ethnic 
categories are rigid and in order to belong to a group members often feel that they have 
to do more than just refrain from voicing their opposition to the nationalist campaign. If 
you don’t participate in the struggle your loyalties may be questioned – as has recently 
been the case for the shrinking minority of Christians among the Palestinian 
population.121 
a. Revived Hatreds 
Jerzy Jedlicki, writing about the Polish-Ukrainian historic enmity notes that motives and 
arguments drawn from history play an important, if not crucial role in most ethnic or 
nationalist conflict. There seem to be two ways, he notes, in which a vivid historical 
memory “fans the flame” of current animosities:122 
1. Through process of sanctification of some historical evens that transforms their 
dates, places, actors and relics into powerful symbols, and the stories into 
undying myths.  
2. A memory of collective wrongs and losses suffered in the past from another 
nation, but also awareness, even if dim, of one’s own nation’s responsibility for 
wrongs done to other peoples, burden the present conflict with strong 
resentments and make it appear to be either a historical repetition, or a historical 
redress. 
The fear of victimization and its reinforcement through the recollection of past suffering 
often leaves the individual citizen with very few political choices. Jack Snyder writes 
that in Serbia the elites promoted chauvinistic nationalism for their own self-interest, 
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when they needed mass support to protect their rule.123 Instrumentalist, or “elite 
manipulation” theories partly explain the process that feeds campaigns of nationalist 
mobilization. The main motivation behind such campaigns, they claim, can often be 
found in a leader’s struggle to preserve personal power. Ethnic entrepreneurs thus use 
nationalism as a tool to turn their “personal need” (or greed) into “collective need,” 
which then becomes instruments of action and solidarity.124 Often elites begin a spiral of 
nationalist rhetoric, and once it takes off, they become trapped in it and are forced to act 
out the ideology that they have promoted in order not to loose credibility.125 This was 
the case in Serbia, where nationalism forced loyalty to the state. In the absence of a 
strong state and in the face of institutional collapse, it provided legitimacy to the leaders 
while at the same time exempting them from political accountability. Most people were 
led to believe that nationalism would serve their interests, because only people who 
shared nationalist ideals were allowed into the decision-making process. Thus, the 
sources of differing opinions were few or manipulated.126  
Related to this is the notion of “ethnic outbidding,” a process by which competing elites 
tap nationalist hostilities by their efforts to “round up” their constituents. Latent 
nationalism and symbolic politics are then easily revived along ethnic lines. Whether 
such “outbidding” works depends on the extent to which nationalism is a credible 
alternative and thus ready to be exploited. V.P Gagnon tries to show that there was not a 
strong base for nationalism before the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia.  Had ethnicity 
been latent or “ready” in Serbia claims Gagnon, the leaders would not have had to 
appeal to terrible injustices beyond the direct experience of the audience, but simply to 
just cause.127 Rather, she argues, ethnic rhetoric was forced, and it was only one means 
to gain solidarity in the midst of other political and economic problems.128 
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Another explanation for the revival of hatreds is the ethnic security dilemma. As one 
ethnic group tends to its own security by mobilizing, it also increases the uncertainty for 
other groups. When another group responds by taking its own measures for defense, an 
arms race is set in motion and mutual suspicion begins to spiral. Whereas some authors 
claim that ethnic security dilemmas only lead to violence in those cases where there is 
already a history of bloodshed and hatred, “rational actor” contenders claim that the 
hatred leading to violence is created – regardless of previous conditions – by the ethnic 
security dilemma. Kaufman claims that serious violence occurs only when three 
conditions obtain: when ethnic myths justify predatory goals, when conditions justify 
fears of extinction, and when leaders take the opportunity to stoke mass hostility, 
mobilize followers on a chauvinist platform and create a security dilemma.129  
Clearly, history does matter for determining the extent to which nationalism can be used 
as a tool in contemporary politics. Recollections of past suffering are needed to stir up 
the hatred required for carrying out ethnic violence and atrocities. Unquestionably, says 
Steven Majstorovic, the historic dimension makes such conflicts much more difficult to 
resolve than should the definable interests of only the present generation be at stake. He 
writes: 
This past has been invented, imagined, constructed, remembered, and 
reconstructed by ethnic elites and nationalists in an ongoing process that combines 
history and contemporary events for the preservation of national identity. In short, 
this past is a sort of geological project in which historical layers and sediments are 
chosen for particular exploitation by ethnic entrepreneurs.130 
The problem for negotiation is that myths are always “somewhat true.” Thus, they 
cannot always be ignored. 
b. On Forgetting Memory 
If one of the parties fighting for a territorial absolute should manage to win a total 
victory (by ethnic cleansing, transfer, assimilation or independence), chances are that 
such an outcome would only create new memories of collective suffering that could be 
used at the next opportunity for revenge. Goertz & Diehl found that almost 40 percent 
of the parties to a territorial dispute meet in a militarized dispute within 30 years of their 
first encounter.131  
Sentimental attachment to a motherland often becomes stronger for those ethnic groups 
that at some point have been forcefully exiled from their place of origin. Absolute space 
often becomes more than just a memory – in fact, for many groups it comes to represent 
either the “Garden of Eden” or the “center of the universe,” thus essential not only to 
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their identity but also to their faith.  Again, the most poignant examples are Israel and 
Kosovo,132 but there are also “lesser” varieties, such as the Protestants of Northern 
Ireland, and the Boer population of South Africa. Although we would like to think that 
reconciliation is always possible, it comes as no surprise that some authors suggest that 
we are dealing with “wired” trauma133  
The assumption in conflict management is often that in order to solve the present battle 
we first need to settle the underlying problem. In conflicts over territorial absolutes, the 
tendency however is often the reverse: the more we can ignore the past, the easier it will 
be to solve the present battle. A conflict may emerge as a direct result of discriminatory 
or repressive politics but the longer the conflict goes on, the more likely it is that 
participants will seek meaning and justification for the conflict from their past. 
However, history (as we know from the earlier discussion on myths) is not objective, 
and thus it can be constructed almost upon demand;134 injustices suffering under the 
hands of other states or other groups can easily be attributed to the present enemy and 
used as a justification for “defensive” atrocities.135  
Analysts and practitioners may have perfectly viable alternatives for peacefully 
resolving the present conflict, but this is not going to help if part of a society sees itself 
as fighting a religious war where suicide bombing is considered a legitimate form of 
struggle. There are different ways in which memories, trauma, collective suffering and 
the urge for revenge can be dealt with. Three approaches are briefly discussed here: 
restorative justice; the work of memory; and “oblivion.”  
Restorative justice refers here to a number of methods dealing with compensation, 
retribution or punishment. The Hague tribunals for the conflict in former Yugoslavia 
and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission are examples of structures 
set up to deal with past suffering. Whereas restorative justice can play a tremendous role 
for reconciliation in some conflicts, many scholars suggest that the search for truth 
together with justice may be in conflict with the purpose of reconciliation.136 
“Scratching the wounds” of the past, reminds Michael Ignatieff, could be the beginning 
of a new war. In places such as former Yugoslavia he says, there is no chance that 
hostile parties will recognize the same truth, so one should not set one’s hopes in the 
healing properties of truth.137 The past, he writes, is not a sacred text that has been 
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“stolen and vandalized and that can be repaired and returned to some well-lit glass case 
in some grand public rotunda.” All that a truth commissions can achieve is to reduce the 
number of lies that circulate unchallenged.138 
Another approach is called “the work of memory,” and it refers to a conscious joint 
effort by well-trusted leaders to shape divergent and hostile memories into a common 
framework that can let different perspectives coexist almost as if on different sides of 
the same coin. There are some success stories that can illustrate this process, most 
notably the French-German reconciliation.139 However, the ‘work of memory’ does not 
happen within the period of a presidential term but rather has to be shaped over many 
generations. Moreover, it is also conditional on exceptional leaders that can sustain and 
reinforce the process. 140  
The third suggestion, “oblivion” is perhaps the most simple but the least viable option. 
Writing about Kosovo Noel Marcus suggests that the conflict could be resolved if only 
the Serbians simply let go of Kosovo and decided collectively to forget or change their 
national myths by convincing themselves that they are either outdated or erroneous.141 
But once events have become a massive national trauma, forgetting them would be 
counter to a group’s moral responsibility and the sentiments of collective “self-
righteousness” that feed on such memories. Further, identity and solidarity are often 
dependent on conflict. Zartman writes that collective identity needs the protection and 
assertion that comes from feelings of separation and superiority. This is achieved by 
conflict, and conflict is the way to obtain the solidarity necessary for effective action. 
As a result, normal cost-benefit calculations on which negotiation behavior should be 
based no longer work.142  
Because myths do not need “factual corroboration in order to reproduce themselves,” 
they are not likely to be amenable to contradictory evidence. Rather, myths are 
sustained by the inner world – by paranoia, longing and desire – and they can only be 
undone when there is a need for them go away, not when they are refuted by evidence 
from the outer world.143 Hence, for places like Kosovo, Bosnia, Kashmir, Tibet, Israel 
and Northern Ireland it may just not be possible to find solutions that are both “just” and 
feasible, since whatever is a crime for one side is always a glorious past for the other.144 
The hope, says Majstorovic, is in the cooling or emotions, which requires “forgetting” at 
least the importance of memory. “Alzheimer,” he continues, would be useful in the case 
of Kosovo, where each generation reshapes the “historical” clay of memory, thus 
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constraining the alternatives for subsequent political elites. Because in the case of 
Kosovo he says, the shape of the historical clay limits the choices for peace and 
compromise.145  
c. Proposition 2 
# The more “collective suffering” added to a conflict, 
the more difficult it will be to negotiate. 
 
Symbolism and Religion 
Conflict over absolute space is fought over “tangible” stakes that have taken on 
“intangible” characteristics. Hence, in conflicts where ethnicity and territory have 
become closely connected, and where ethnicity has become highly charged with historic 
and symbolic or religious elements, agreeing to settle the question of final ownership 
over land in favor of the opponent becomes an existential question, equivalent to giving 
up one’s own identity and religion:146 
Sacred places are not plots of land to be partitioned by diplomats according to 
political priorities, no matter how good their intentions. They may, for 
considerable segments of the population, entail meaning that is absolute, 
irreplaceable and indivisible. Nor are disputes over sacred space a thing of the past. 
The costs of mismanaging disputes over sacred space in the 21st century will be 
substantial and measured in human lives.147  
David Rapoport substantiates this prediction when he writes that most internal wars 
since 1945 have been ethno-religious148 and that this proportion keeps rising, as does 
their length. Ethno-religious wars are especially savage and intractable writes Rapoport, 
because identity questions command our deepest emotions, and space and identity are 
so closely connected that entire lands often appear sacred. 149 
What gives space symbolic or spiritual value? If values are what determine stakes, they 
should closely correlate with the indivisibility or symbolic and spiritual attribute of 
issues. Values often rise with time, suggesting that the longer the duration of a conflict, 
                                                 
145 Majstorovic, “Autonomy of the Sacred…” (2000), p. 172 
146 See Hoyt S. Alverson, “The Roots of Time: A Comment on Utilitarian and Primordial 
Sentiments in Ethnic Identification,” in Raymond Hall, E thnic A utonomy Comparative Dynamics (1979), 
pp. 13-17 
147 Hassner, “Conflict over Sacred Space…” (2001), p. 48 
148 In contrast to most civil wars, the aim of ethno-religious wars is usually not to control a state’s 
entire space although some ethno-religious struggles, like in Rwanda and Burundi, have this feature. 
Much more often however, they seek to redraw state boundaries, and to create a new sovereign 
state; Irredenta demands, (union with a related group) are made 1/3 as often. See Rapoport, “The 
Importance of Space …” (1996) 
149 Internal wars today persist six times longer than they did a century ago. See David Rapoport, 
“The Importance of Space…” (1996), p. 1  
 31
the more has been invested in the conflict so the higher the values at stake. Looking 
specifically at incidents of crises in internal conflicts, Brecher & Wilkenfeld found that 
the more protracted a conflict, the more likely it is to be characterized by a perceived 
threat to more basic values. The central feature of most protracted conflict, they write, is 
a deep, abiding clash over multiple values, whether between ideologies, civilizations, or 
belief systems.150 However, just because a stake has high value, it does not 
automatically become absolute; it also has to be perceived as infinitely zero-sum, which 
is true for the sacred and symbolic. 
We would expect an absolute to become zero-sum because it is connected to questions 
of identity, existence and survival. The relationship between ethnicity and threat to 
values is presented in the table below. Brecher & Wilkenfeld found that ethnicity-
related crises differed from non-ethnicity related crises with respect to the most serious 
of all threats as perceived by crisis actors, in that two types of threats especially stood 
out. These were the threat to existence or grave damage and the threat to territory. 
Whereas ethnicity-related protracted crises (PCs) showed a 26 percent threat to 
existence and of grave damage, this number was only 11 percent for non-PC ethnicity-
related crises and 15 percent for non-ethnic conflict cases. Similarly, territorial threats 
accounted for 60 percent of all ethnicity-related crises, regardless of whether or not the 
crisis occurred within a protracted conflict. This was more than twice the proportion of 
non-ethnicity crises, which were at 24 percent.151 The findings are summarized in the 
table below: 
Table1: Ethnicity, Protracted Conflict, and Threat to Values 
 Low 
Threat 
Political Territory Influence Grave 
Damage 
Existence TOTAL 
Ethnic 
PC 
3 5% 4 7% 36 59% 2 3% 8 13% 8 13% 61 19% 
Ethnic 
non-PC 
4 7% 9 16% 35 61% 3 5% 1 2% 5 9% 57 17% 
Non-
ethnic 
19 9% 78 3%7 51 24% 31 15% 18 9% 13 6% 210 64% 
TOTAL 26 8% 91 %28 122 37% 36 11% 27 8% 26 8% 328 100% 
X2 = 62.13, p = .00    Source: Brecher & Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), 2000, p.127 
 
Writing specifically about how “sacred” space accrues its value, Hassner explains that 
four conditions are important for making space non-negotiable and zero-sum: 
1) Parties must compete over an item, the target of their dispute. 
                                                 
150 Brecher & Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (2000), p. 160; While each specific crisis within an 
ongoing protracted conflict might focus on a limited goal or issue, the authors found that it was 
invariably linked to the enduring values in conflict over a prolonged period. By contrast, threatened 
values in other crises are specific to the issue in immediate dispute, without the psychological 
baggage of ongoing conflict. Thus, crises within a protracted conflict tend to involve more basic 
values. 
151 ibid, p.29 
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2) Parties must mean precisely the same thing when they refer to the target they are 
competing over. If there is no perfect overlap of their perceptions then it is, at 
least in part, divisible. 
3) Parties must agree that the target cannot be parceled-out or subdivided without 
significantly diminishing its subjective value.  
4) Parties must agree that the target is not fungible, that it cannot be substituted for 
or exchanged for something of equal value. 
“Sacred” space, he says, has to fulfill at least the last three dimensions: whereas the first 
dimension – the geographic – suggests clearly defined and inflexible boundaries, the 
second, the geometric dimension, “exhibits monolithic space that cannot be 
subdivided.” Third, the spiritual dimension represents the uniqueness of the site for 
which no material or spiritual substitute is available. Each of these dimensions says 
Hassner are necessary and together create what he calls an “invisibility conundrum.”152 
He adds a fourth dimension, the historical dimension, which he says explains why these 
indivisible spaces are so dispute prone. 
Jerzy Jedlicki similarly writes that conventional solutions to multi-ethnic or deeply 
divided societies may not work for societies fighting over historic, symbolic or sacred 
land. The problem he explains, is the “sacralization” of the “lieux de memoire,” 
effectively blocking such outcomes — because whereas interests can be mediated, 
sacred things cannot.153 Jerusalem and Kosovo are the most typical of such places, he 
writes. It is said that Kosovo is so sacred and inherent to the Serbian national 
consciousness that giving it up to the Albanians would be seen as a sacrilege, a betrayal 
and a dreadful humiliation.154 Further, the repetition of clashes throughout history has 
played a role in increasing the Serbian “spiritual” investment in Kosovo, inflating their 
sense of belonging to the land. 
Writing about the life cycle of religion and ethnic identity – its emergence and revival – 
and the interconnectedness between the two, James Kurth explains that there are two 
main trends in this revival.155 First, religious identity can emerge from a totally ethnic 
one. Second, ethnic revival happens in a totally religious community (this he calls 
“secularization”). Each religion claims Kurth, have shaped three different kinds of 
secularizations, and through these framework they continue to shape norms and values 
of those communities.156 Kurth writes: 
In some cases the religious seems to have “departed” completely from the secular 
and only the material seems to remain. However, even then fainter versions of the 
original religious authority and community linger with distinct conceptions of 
secular authority and community, and also distinct ideas about politics and 
economics. Thus, even when an ethnic community has become completely 
secularized, it will still hold secular conceptions that bear the imprint of (and are 
                                                 
152 Hassner, “Conflict over Sacred Space” (2001), p. 15 
153 Jedlicki, “Historical Memory…”(1999), p. 230 
154 ibid.  
155 James Kurth, “Religion and Ethnic Conflict” (2001), p. 284 
156 ibid 
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analogous to) earlier religious one and are different from the conceptions held by 
other secularized ethnic communities.157 
Ethnic conflict, says Kurth, may be a sign of the failure of secularization; that the past 
and present are intertwined in an unconscious web of normative attributes, resembling 
Weber’s picture of the protestant ethnics. Such an explanation sheds a light on the 
apparent increase in both religion and ethnicity in the world today. However, the 
implication might be that even if religion and ethnicity went away, conflict might not.  
a. Ethnic Election 
Most of the hypotheses from which ethnic survival is said to depart are objective, 
focusing mostly on political, economic or ecological factors.158 However, it is important 
to remember that some of the most pervasive ethnic groups throughout history have 
survived without political autonomy or a homeland of their own, and even without a 
common language. Smith notes that the most “successful” ethnic groups are those who 
have managed to cultivate a “myth of ethnic election:” the “creation and dissemination” 
by specialists of the belief that they are a chosen people.159 Ethnic election, writes 
Smith, is more than ethnocentrism or a cultivated sense of uniqueness through myths, 
values and tradition, in that it also comes with moral obligations. In order to qualify as 
the “elect” members often have to fulfill certain observances required for those who are 
“sacred” or “sanctified.” Ethnic election does not automatically lead to conflict with 
other groups. However, in cases where prophetic visions are connected to irredentist 
claims problems often become apparent. 
Hassner claims that the forcefulness and the volatility of sacred land can be attributed to 
the historic competition over a space through the branching of religions into sectarian 
groups.160 Thus, we would expect the worst conflicts over “sacred” space to occur in 
places that serve as a religious “source” for more than one religious tradition, where 
those religions have grown out of each other. However, while this description fits with 
Jerusalem, it cannot be said to be true about Kosovo. Although the Albanians may have 
some spiritual connection with the land because they lived there for generations, there 
has never been a spiritual/elective element in the sense that the land is said to be the 
source of their religion. 
The historic/sectarian thesis works better when explaining the bickering of the monks 
over pieces of floor in the Holy Sepulcher than in the larger conflict framework. The 
main reason being that ethnic conflicts over territorial absolutes are neither primarily 
over religion nor over ethnicity; they are political conflicts over the control of territory, 
albeit with strong ethnic and religious characteristics. Looking at Kosovo and the 
                                                 
157 ibid, p. 285 
158 For instance, a history of political autonomy, or leadership qualities; possession and location of 
homelands, their location, extent and population; presence of material resources, facilities and skills 
for supporting a community; networks of communication, including customs, language and 
symbolic codes. See A. Smith, “Chosen People” in Hutchinson & Smith, E thnicity (1996) 
159 Smith, “Chosen People” (1996) 
160 Hassner, “Conflict over Sacred Space” (2001), p. 18 
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Middle East, both cases have experienced recurring historic sequences of territorial 
conquest and redemption. In old Jerusalem one can see the layers of the conquerors 
literally staked out in cross sections of buried ground.  This is an example of what 
Hassner calls the “layering of sacred space” – the product of successive conquests and 
syncretism (you incorporate other religions into your own). The challenge for 
contemporary conflict management is to be neutral as to the relative importance of each 
of these layers without ignoring the importance of history. 
Current-day Israel presents a fascinating example where the religious and historic 
meaning of space has been used as a political tool to ingrain the connection between the 
identity and the land in the population.161 A “fast forward” version of such “making of 
space” could be observed in 1982 in the Sinaii town of Yamit, as it was to be turned 
over to Egypt as a result of the Begin-Sadat Agreement. Despite the fact that Yamit or 
Sinai is not part of the Jewish “promised land” and is not mentioned in the Bible, it soon 
took on symbolic and religious meaning for the residents as they connected it with the 
“myths” of Israel: that land has to be kept for security reasons, and that they as residents 
are bound to the task, as it is described in the Bible, of conquering the desert and 
making it bloom.162  
Ethnic election with a connection to land is a fascinating attribute of only a few groups 
throughout human history, the Jewish people being perhaps the strongest example. By 
appealing to myths, the residents of Yamit were hoping to “inoculate” the land against 
Israeli withdrawal, i.e., make it “sacred” and therefore also absolute, so that it could not 
be given up at any cost. Other people whose stories resemble that of Israel are the Serbs, 
the Boers in South Africa, the Protestants in Northern Ireland and the Hopi Indians of 
Arizona. 
b. Perceptive Righteousness 
Does Serbia have a “right” to Kosovo because of its religious beliefs? Religious beliefs 
have to do with truth, and truth is never one-dimensional. The problem can be called 
“perceptive justice” – the connection between sacred space, identity, and historical 
myths – that transforms one’s own claims to the land to what is right, good, true, or real, 
while simultaneously transforming “enemy” claims to what is false, evil, bad or 
fabricated. Ethnic groups can have parallel histories but “reversed truths;” myths and 
legends of one side often appear in the stories of the enemy as well, only with the parts 
of heroes and martyrs reversed. Tim Hicks writes that many conflicts that are or appear 
to be rooted in tangible sources are often “floating on an undercurrent of identity and 
reality-perception issues.” 163 
Michael Ignatieff writes that the key obstacle for reconciliation in such cases is the 
desire among ethnic groups for revenge. Revenge, he claims, is given moral legitimacy 
as a ritual form of respect for a community’s dead, essentially taking up their cause. 
                                                 
161 For fascinating stories about how a custom of hiking and camping activities (Tiyyolim) has been 
used to connect young Israelis with the land, see Meron Benvinisti, Sacred L andscapes – The Buried 
History of the Holy L and Since 1948 (2000); Also see Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory (1983) 
162 Nurit Kliot & Stanley Waterman (eds.) Pluralism and Political Geography (1983), p. 175 
163 Hicks, “Another Look at Identity-Based Conflict” (2001), p. 38-39 
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Reconciliation is difficult when it has to compete with such violence, which is seen as a 
perfectly moral and ethical alternative.164 But could it be that secularization and the 
“loss” of this false justice, as well as the need to face up to responsibility also play a 
role in stirring people’s resentments? Sardamov writes that it seems like Serbs had 
become a “comfortable” people who had lost their status as valiant heroes and martyrs, 
and “succumbed” to the reality of events. Bitterness and resentment over national 
humiliation and the loss of self-respect seems to be a powerful incentive for 
ethnocentrism and religious fanaticism.165 Writing about the Serbian “Mandate of 
History,” Ivelin Sardanov explains how the Serbian focus on nationalism and 
victimization from a historical and cultural perspective as well as the use of rehearsal to 
arouse this “cult” among younger generations, have increased the their feeling of 
superiority among the South-Slav people and made them “assured” of the righteousness 
of their cause.166 
The biggest hurdle that such “false righteousness” presents for negotiations comes when 
the “elect” becomes chauvinist. While portraying the members of another group in as 
bad a light as possible, their human traits and virtues are either forgotten or turned into 
faults. In extreme cases of chauvinist nationalism the members of the other group is 
proclaimed to be inhuman, satanic beings. Writing about Kosovo, Zlatko Isakovic 
writes that “demonization” is what starts off the spiral of fear, prejudice, violence, and 
atrocities. Nurturing group narcissism, he says, is quite cheap compared to raising 
people’s standard of living.167 
Political leaders sometimes press for total victory in a conflict since a continuation of 
violence is in their interest as it allows them to ride on nationalist sentiments to stay in 
power, and gives them time to create facts on the ground. For such leaders cooperative 
or peaceful moves of the other side are seen as threats, since it puts the enemy in a good 
light, appearing to be willing to compromise. This is when ethnic stereotypes, 
“perceptive righteousness” and symbolic or religious truth come in handy. Referring to 
past victimhood, reviving myths of prejudice and making categorical statements about 
the other side are common strategies used by the stronger side, while at the same time 
provoking violent reactions from the weaker party.  Punishment can then be used as a 
form of escalation, creating a new “fresh” round of conflict, while blaming it on the 
weaker side. 
c. Proposition 3 
# The more territory is associated with symbolism and 
religion, the more difficult it is to negotiate 
                                                 
164 Ignatieff, A  Warrior’s Honor (1997), p. 188 
165 This is somewhat similar to the Muslim struggle to regain the status that was taken from them 
with the retreat of their glorious civilization. 
166 See Sardamov, “Mandate of History” (1996) 
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Conclusion 
If a conflict involves a perceived or unconsciously experienced threat to identity, 
religion, or any other largely ascriptive criteria, our reaction should be to develop 
mechanisms that enable us to understand the nature of the threat in order to be able to 
resolve the conflict more effectively. Notions of sacred space tied with ethnic identity 
are often forgotten in the negotiation literature, and instead other issues or conditions 
are claimed to more accurately reflect the underlying grievances.  However, negotiators 
and participants will be unable to make good decisions in the midst of incompatibilities 
if the underlying source of the conflict is ignored or avoided.  
It seems like the talent of compromise is characteristically missing from parties who are 
involved in negotiations over territorial absolutes. We often hear the argument that we 
need to change negative perceptions, hatreds, distrust, and prejudice, in order to teach 
the parties to “get along” so that they can handle their own disputes in the future. 
However, in some conflicts parties just will not cooperate, because they have no desire 
to do so. More likely, they even have a secret desire to get rid of the other side 
completely.168  Hence, ethnic protracted conflicts are unlikely to be resolved by simply 
applying some “love and forgiveness;” they will requires new structures and detailed 
contracts that go beyond gentlemen’s agreements, and that require investments after, 
rather than prior to, a political settlement. Perhaps, as Ignatieff suggests, in the end the 
only thing that the parties can truly share is the mourning of the dead through the shared 
inheritance of the “democracy of death.”169 
From the analysis of territorial absolutes we know only a little about how “sacred 
stones” are created – that it happens over a long period of time, and from multiple and 
complex conditions. It is a result of the protractedness of conflict and the “layering” of 
history; the myths of martyrdom and memories of collective suffering; the self-
justification and glorification and the need for revenge; the resentment and humiliation 
that grows from constant reminders of past responsibility for wrongs; and because my 
God is better than your God… Yet, we don’t know the exact process by which such 
transformations take place, the speed at which they happen or the warning signals that 
precede them. Unfortunately, it seems as if territorial absolutes can be created much 
more easily than they can be resolved.  
As indicated in the beginning of this study, there are no standard solutions. However, 
knowing more about identity and its connection to territory, as well as the myths and 
prejudices that lead to atrocities, may help us look deeper into such conflicts to study 
the cause and effect of such relationships, rather than just labeling them “irrational.” 
Kaufman suggests that the reason why some ethnic conflicts erupt in violence while not 
others, has to do with already pre-conceived understandings of the motivations of the 
enemy, that result in repeated hostile interactions between two parties over time. 
Knowing this is imperative for preventing such destructive cycles from being created in 
the future.  
                                                 
168 The Israeli author Meron Benvinisti, recalls the exhilaration initially expressed by Israeli leaders 
when in 1948 the land had been “swept clean” (although accidentally) as if in preparation for their 
arrival. See Benvinisti, Sacred L andscapes (2000), Ch. 3  
169 Ignatieff, A  Warrior’s Honor (1997), p. 190 
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However, as Kaufman also suggests, it is “modern” hatreds rather than ancient myths 
that lies at the core of conflicts when they break out. Parties do not lie in wait for the 
next opportunity to strike back at their old enemy. Rather it is a plethora of current 
conditions – political, social, economic and cultural – that cause former enemies to look 
around for the most likely scapegoat for their problems. As a conflict becomes violent 
with the intensity that only ethnicity seems to be able to produce, new stakes are added 
to the old ones, old settlements are declared invalid, and demands are inflated out of 
proportion. Zartman notes that ethnic groups often develop demands that are 
unacceptable to the state because they often have little to offer except for an end to 
violence. Such were the situations of Eritrea and Kosovo, where the ethnic group 
presented claims that were simply outrageous to the Ethiopians and the Serbians.170 
Similarly, the Palestinians, who have lost what is “rightfully theirs” and therefore 
already have a negative account, are demanding to be compensated for losses without 
giving anything in return.  
The discussion about absolutes has given us some valuable insights into the difficulty of 
negotiating conflicts over sacred or symbolic space, while still not giving us any clear 
answers to how absolutes could be successfully resolved. However, rather than wait to 
intervene until the parties have exhausted themselves militarily, third parties can 
carefully act to push the parties closer to “ripeness;” which is the subjective perception 
that continuing the conflict is more costly than the potential benefits to be gained in 
negotiations. Steven Majstorovic, suggests that whether in Kosovo, Timor, or Tibet, the 
real issue is between nation-state sovereignty versus autonomy for “compact 
minorities.” But what kind of autonomy? The least worst approach he claims, would be 
to give both parties most of what they really want and get the international community 
to realize that all states cannot be completely sovereign.171 Whether such autonomy 
exists remains outside of the scope of this study, but what is clear is that the 
international community has to take a more proactive role in dealing with these 
conflicts, while still being sensitive to the possibility that outside intervention can 
sometimes be more destructive than useful.172  
Is negotiation over absolutes a waste of time? There are definitely examples of success, 
but there are simultaneously many cases where success has been short lived. It may be 
that the nature of the negotiation process has to focus much more on managing rather 
than resolving absolutes, while investing in political and economic development, 
“peace” education and the rebuilding of war-torn societies. The difficulty in negotiating 
conflicts over absolute space thus comes from the close relationship between territory 
and identity, where territory is imbued with spiritual and symbolic meaning. In addition 
to the physical safety of a group, threats to territory are also threats to identity and 
religion. Myths and memory are essential for keeping territorial absolutes “non-
negotiable” and false justification and ethnic stereotypes easily justify pre-emptive 
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“self-defense,” especially when leaders take the opportunity to play the nationalistic 
card. 
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